We propose a theory of regulatory arbitrage by banks and test it using trust preferred securities (TPS) issuance. From 1996 to 2007, U.S. banks in the aggregate increased their regulatory capital through issuance of TPS while their net issuance of common stock was negative due to repurchases. We assume that, in the absence of capital requirements, a bank has an optimal capital structure that depends on its business model. Capital requirements can impose constraints on bank decisions. If a bank's optimal capital structure also meets regulatory capital requirements with a sufficient buffer, the bank is unconstrained by these requirements. We expect that unconstrained banks will not issue TPS, that constrained banks will issue TPS and engage in other forms of regulatory arbitrage, and that banks with TPS will be riskier than other banks with the same amount of regulatory capital, and therefore, more adversely affected by the credit crisis. Our empirical evidence supports these predictions.
Introduction
Among academics, regulators, and bankers, much attention is devoted to the appropriate level of bank capital (see Thakor (2013) for a review). Following the credit crisis, many have argued that regulatory capital requirements should be increased substantially. Banks can choose the composition of their capital within regulatory limits. The assets used in the computation of the main regulatory capital ratio are riskweighted and ignore a wide range of off-balance-sheet exposures. It is well known that many banks optimize their balance sheets and the composition of their capital to minimize the impact of capital requirements on their activities. This practice is often called regulatory arbitrage. While it is known that many banks engage in regulatory arbitrage, the existing literature does not explain why some banks do not. In this paper, we develop a theory of why banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and test the theory using banks' issuance of trust preferred securities (TPS) in the U.S. Our theory explains why some banks did not participate in regulatory arbitrage by issuing TPS.
In October 1996, the Federal Reserve Board authorized bank holding companies to include trust preferred securities (TPS) as Tier 1 regulatory capital up to a threshold level. As shown in Figure 1 , U.S. bank holding companies raised regulatory capital in the aggregate through TPS and were net repurchasers of common stock from 1996 to 2007. TPS are a form of so-called hybrid capital. They are cumulative non-perpetual preferred securities issued by subsidiaries of bank holding companies whose sole asset is junior subordinated debt issued by the bank holding company. As with other debt, interest on TPS is taxdeductible to the bank holding company. Interest paid to the trust on the debt is used to pay quarterly dividends to TPS investors. Interest payments are deferrable for up to 20 quarters without triggering default. Using TPS instead of equity to meet regulatory capital requirements provides a bank with a weaker cushion in the event of an adverse shock, as TPS are effectively a mix of equity and debt. Hence, if two banks have exactly the same Tier 1 capital ratios, but one includes some TPS and the other includes only common equity, the all-equity bank is less likely to default given an adverse shock. Post-crisis regulatory changes eliminated the option for banks to increase regulatory capital through TPS issuance.
We propose a simple theory of regulatory arbitrage. The theory is neoclassical in that it ignores agency problems. We assume that regulatory capital requirements impose a constraint on a bank's leverage and asset choices. Whether this constraint is binding depends crucially on the bank's optimal leverage in the absence of regulation. We assume that without capital requirements each bank has an optimal level of risk that depends on its business model. To achieve its target level of risk, the bank chooses an asset mix and a capital structure. We assume that the target level of risk can be represented by the bank's target probability of default. This assumption matches the economic capital approach used by large banks since these banks select their levels of economic capital to achieve a desired credit rating, which corresponds to a probability of default (see, for instance, Matten (2000)). In this simple world, a bank can have a target probability of default low enough that it is not constrained by regulatory capital requirements. By contrast, these regulatory requirements force some banks to be less risky than they would otherwise prefer. These constrained banks will practice regulatory arbitrage to come as close as possible to their target level of risk.
We assume that only two forms of capital are available to meet regulatory requirements: equity and TPS. We predict that an unconstrained bank will not issue TPS because TPS are effectively subordinated debt. Therefore, using TPS instead of equity would increase a bank's probability of default, which is suboptimal for an unconstrained bank already at its optimal level of risk. In contrast, for constrained banks, TPS create a valuable regulatory arbitrage opportunity. A constrained bank will issue TPS instead of equity because using TPS allows the bank to bring its probability of default closer to its target level, yet still satisfy regulatory capital requirements.
To test our theory, we have to determine whether or not a bank is constrained by capital requirements.
We use two proxies for whether a bank is constrained. The first proxy is a bank's franchise value. An important finding in the banking literature is that banks with higher franchise value hold more capital because these banks have more to lose if they fail (see, for instance, Marcus (1983) , Marcus (1984) , Keeley (1990) , and Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) ). High franchise value could arise from a number of factors, such as valuable relationships, a profitable deposit base, and so on. From our theory, we expect banks with high franchise values to be less constrained by capital requirements and to hold little or no TPS. We find strong support for this prediction. Our second proxy is a measure of how close a bank is to its regulatory capital threshold. In a world where raising capital quickly is costly, banks will hold a buffer stock of capital to cope with adverse shocks and to avoid the cost of raising capital. We consider a bank as constrained by regulation if its buffer stock of capital is low. 1 Using the second proxy, we also find evidence consistent with our theory. Banks are more likely to use TPS if they are more constrained, i.e., if their excess regulatory capital levels are low.
If a bank is constrained by capital requirements, it can use TPS to alter the composition of its capital and increase the numerator of its Tier 1 capital ratio. 2 However, it can also use its discretion to take actions that affect the denominator of the ratio, i.e., the risk-weighted assets. Under our theory, we would expect constrained banks to do both. Since the denominator of the capital ratio involves risk weights, banks cannot simply choose to increase asset risk. Rather, we expect constrained banks to choose to arbitrage these risk weights. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) examine such an arbitrage. They study how banks use asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits to reduce risk-weighted assets on their balance sheets and note that these conduits transfer the assets, but not the underlying risk, from bank balance sheets. As an additional test of our theory, we examine whether the same banks that use ABCP also use TPS, and find strong supportive evidence. Notably, of the 25 banks that have ABCP conduits, 24 also use TPS. A low Tier 1 ratio, one of our two proxies for capital constraints, predicts ABCP usage, and there is a positive and significant relation between TPS and ABCP usage in regression analyses.
With our theory, a constrained bank would quickly substitute equity with TPS upon passage of the new regulation to reduce the gap between its actual probability of default and the probability of default it 1 We recognize that this approach is somewhat imprecise for two reasons. First, there are multiple capital requirements, so that a bank's buffer stock might differ substantially across measures. For instance, U.S. banks must meet a regulatory leverage ratio test where the denominator of the capital requirement formula is total assets rather than risk-weighted assets. A bank can have a large buffer with respect to the ratio that uses risk-weighted assets but a low buffer with respect to the leverage ratio. Second, a bank could choose to have a lower buffer stock simply because it has low risk. We control for systematic and idiosyncratic risk in our empirical analyses. 2 Tier 1 capital for the period we study in this paper includes total shareholders' equity minus goodwill and other intangibles (except for mortgage-servicing rights) plus qualifying hybrid securities and non-controlling interests. Perpetual preferred stock and trust preferred securities were permitted up to a regulatory limit (approximately 15% of a BHC's core capital for large banks and 25% a BHC's core capital for small banks). would choose absent capital requirements. We find limited evidence that banks used TPS to repurchase common equity. One reason for this weak result is that bank regulators impose limits on the amount of common stock a bank may repurchase and on dividends it can pay. 3 Given these constraints, it was more common for banks to use TPS as a source of funds when they had to increase their capital. For example, when they made acquisitions or experienced considerable internal growth that would have reduced their Tier 1 capital ratios, banks used TPS instead of equity to maintain their prior Tier 1 capital ratios.
With our theory, banks that meet capital requirements with TPS rather than equity should be riskier and hence more vulnerable to adverse shocks. We investigate our predictions and show that they hold.
First, we find that banks with more TPS in Tier 1 capital have a lower distance to default during our sample period. Second, we find that banks with more TPS in Tier 1 capital are significantly more likely to receive funds from the Capital Purchase Program, the part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program through which the Treasury purchased newly issued preferred stock of banks. Third, banks with more TPS have a significantly lower return on assets during the crisis. Finally, we show that during the crisis, the equity of banks with more TPS performed substantially worse than the equity of other banks.
We contribute to three strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of bank capital. Second, we add to the literature on the impact of capital requirements on banks and on the determinants of regulatory arbitrage. Third, we contribute to the literature on TPS and other hybrid securities. A large body of research examines the determinants of bank capital (see Berlin (2011) and Thakor (2013) for reviews). A common finding in the empirical literature is that banks tend to hold significantly more capital than necessary to meet regulatory requirements. For example, Flannery and Rangan (2008) find that banks had capital levels that were 75% over the regulatory minima in the early 2000s. Berger et al. (2008) note that banks actively manage their capital ratios, set target levels above well-capitalized regulatory minima, and make rapid adjustments toward their targets. Our paper adds to this literature by showing that banks manage not only the level, but also the composition, of their regulatory capital when capital requirements are binding.
Researchers have examined the impact of bank capital and capital regulation on risk shifting. For example, Hovakimian and Kane (2000) examine regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994. We contribute to the risk-shifting literature by showing that constrained banks use TPS to get closer to their optimal leverage ratios, which in turn increases the probability of default. Other literature focuses on the relationship between bank capital and performance. Berger (1995) finds that banks with higher capital had better earnings in the 1980's. More recently, Mehran and Thakor (2011) also provide evidence that better capitalized banks perform better. Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2013) find that before the crisis bank capital was not related to performance, but that during the crisis, higher capital was positively related to stock performance. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) document a positive relationship between bank performance and Tier 1 capital during the recent crisis. Berger and Bouwman (2013) show a positive relationship between capital and market share during crises. All these papers focus either on Tier 1 capital or the ratio of book equity to assets, but none of them examine the influence of TPS. Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that, holding the amount of capital constant, banks with more TPS in their regulatory capital perform worse and are more likely to need government assistance during the crisis. Acharya, Gujral, and Shin (2009) show for a sample of 21 large international banks that the quality of bank capital deteriorated prior to the crisis.
There is also a literature documenting that banks engage in regulatory arbitrage. In fact, the very first working paper of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision concluded: "banks have learnt how to exploit the broad brush nature of the requirements […] . For some banks, this has probably started to undermine the meaningfulness of the requirements." (Jackson (1999)). However, most of the literature on regulatory arbitrage has focused on showing the prevalence and types of regulatory arbitrage rather than modeling a bank's choice to engage in arbitrage. Finally, while there is a small literature on TPS, it only partially addresses the issues we focus on in this paper. 4
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our theory and derives testable hypotheses. Section 3 gives some background on TPS and Section 4 explains the data sources and offers summary statistics. Section 5 contains our main empirical analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
A theory of regulatory arbitrage and predictions for the issuance of trust preferred securities
Banks derive part of their value from providing low risk securities (see, e.g., DeAngelo and Stulz (2014) for a model and references to the literature). They also derive part of their value from loan relationships. Bank assets may become impaired when a bank becomes distressed or fails. As a result, a bank has to trade off the benefits of leverage against the potential costs of financial distress. The benefits of leverage include a greater ability of banks to supply low risk claims, potential tax benefits, and potential benefits from increasing the value of explicit and implicit guarantees, such as deposit insurance.
The costs of financial distress differ across banks since they are business-model dependent, and can also depend on factors other than those already mentioned. For instance, a bank's business model may involve selling long-dated derivatives. Counterparties to a bank for long-dated derivatives are unlikely to find such derivatives valuable if they are concerned about default risk. With this framework, each bank will choose its optimal level of risk, which corresponds to an expected probability of default (or a rating, if the bank is rated). The benefit of this simple approach is that it is consistent with how banks implement economic capital models. Using this approach allows us to derive implications for the use of regulatory arbitrage by banks and more directly about TPS issuance. 4 Benston et al. (2003) examine 67 TPS issuances during 1996 and 1997. They find that the market responds favorably to TPS filings, and that issuers of TPS are larger and more sophisticated and have lower economic capital than non-issuers. Harvey, Collins and Wansley (2003) find that the issuance of TPS from 1996-2000 had a positive impact on bank stock prices, especially for firms that used TPS to retire common or preferred stock. Krishnan and Laux (2005) study trust preferred securities issued by both banks and other corporations, and find that the initial stock price reaction to the issuance of TPS is positive when issuers state a specific reason for issuance. Balasubramanian and Cyree (2010) argue that banks issue TPS to change their capital structure or improve capital ratios, but not for tax benefits. Finally, Kim and Stock (2012) show that the value of existing trust preferred securities increased when banks accepted TARP funding.
We consider a very simple model of a bank using the intuition from Merton (1974) . We assume that the bank manages its probability of default for date T and that it finances itself with equity and debt. The debt has no coupons and a face value F that is payable at date T. In practice, banks often target their probability of default over a period of one year. We treat all debt the same. With these assumptions, we can use Merton (1974) for the value of the debt and for the probability of default.
More formally, following the Merton model, a bank's market value follows a geometric Brownian motion, = + , where V is the value of the bank, is the instantaneous expected rate of return, 2 is the instantaneous variance of the return on the firm per unit of time, and is a standard Gauss-Wiener process.
With our assumptions, the bank's probability of default is given by (see, e.g., Vassalou and Xing (2004) ):
Since firm value follows a geometric Brownian motion, we have that
where +~( 0, 1). Hence, we can replace + in equation (1) with equation (2):
We can define the distance to default as = � �+� − 2 2 � √ . Because +~( 0, 1), we have:
Assuming that V t and the distribution of the return on the bank's assets do not depend on F, which is the standard assumption in applications of Merton (1974) , the probability of default is increasing in the bank's leverage ratio and is increasing in the instantaneous variance of its return. In the model, the bank can decrease its probability of default by replacing debt with equity since doing so decreases F without changing anything else.
In the following analysis, we focus on a bank's ability to select its debt and the volatility of the return of its assets. If investors are not risk neutral, the bank can also affect the expected return on its assets by changing the covariance of its return with the asset pricing kernel. We take this effect to be of secondorder for our analysis, so that we effectively assume risk neutrality. Since the bank chooses F and the volatility of the return of its assets, its probability of default is endogenously determined subject to constraints. 5
A bank may voluntarily choose a low probability of default. Gorton and Winton (2000) provide a model in which a bank chooses lower leverage to protect its charter value, which in their model comes from the value of the bank's corporate borrowing relationships. In DeAngelo and Stulz (2014), a bank's charter value comes from its ability to supply liquid claims, such as deposits. If a bank has valuable relationships with borrowers and depositors that would be lost in bankruptcy, it has incentives to keep its risk low. Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) refer to such banks as having high franchise value. By contrast, a bank with less valuable relationships will find it optimal to take more risks if risk enables business growth. We adopt this perspective and view the relation between the value of a bank's assets and its probability of default as concave and bank specific, so that there is a different probability of default that maximizes each bank's value. Consistent with our perspective, financial institutions in practice typically target credit ratings and endeavor to achieve and maintain those ratings when they have a credit rating. 5 Obvious constraints for banks are that regulations limit a bank's ability to increase the risk of its assets and that capital requirements limit a bank's leverage. Figure 2 shows the value of a bank, V, as a concave function of the probability of default p in the absence of regulation for a high franchise value (HFV) bank and a low franchise value (LFV) bank. The probability of default that maximizes the value of the bank is p * . We define a bank's franchise value as the value that would be lost if the bank becomes distressed. A bank with high franchise value will have a low p * , p HFV * , and a bank with low franchise value will have a higher p * , p LFV * . Figure 2 displays the value of these two banks as a function of their p * .
We now analyze how these two banks are affected by the introduction of a regulator whose capital requirements imply that the bank's probability of default cannot exceed p R . 6 Generally, banks want to hold a buffer of capital so that they will still meet regulatory requirements following an earnings shock. If a bank meets its regulatory capital requirements with an appropriate buffer when it chooses its probability of default p * , the capital requirements implied by p R do not affect the decisions of that bank, since the bank would choose the same probability of default absent these requirements. In Figure 2 , this is true for the high franchise value bank. The low franchise value bank, in contrast, would choose a probability of default p * > p R . Figure 2 shows that, in this case, the value of the bank is lower under capital constraints than if it were unrestricted in setting its capital structure.
Suppose now the regulator relaxes the rules for capital requirements by allowing banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Effectively, these weaker requirements imply an increase in the maximum probability of default a bank can choose. In Figure 2 , this corresponds to a shift of p R to the right to p R' .
Trust-preferred securities are one form of regulatory arbitrage. Because trust preferred securities are hybrids between debt and equity, allowing trust preferred securities in Tier 1 capital moves the regulatorimplied upper bound for the probability of default to the right. 7 Figure 2 shows that the shift of p R to the 6 We recognize that this is a highly simplistic view of capital requirements since banks can meet capital requirements with different choices of liability and asset structures. Nevertheless, our approach clarifies when a bank will find it valuable to practice regulatory arbitrage. 7 Emanuel (1983) shows that the relation between the value of preferred stock and firm value is similar to the relation between the value of debt and firm value since the value of both instruments is a concave function of firm value. In contrast, the relation between the value of common stock and firm value is convex. Preferred stock is riskier than debt that ranks ahead of it in terms of bankruptcy priority, so that it is best viewed as a portfolio of debt and equity. Trust preferred securities are a type of preferred stock. Consequently, a bank that replaces equity with right to p R' does not affect the value of the high franchise value bank. Note also that the tax advantage of the trust preferred securities is not relevant for this bank. This bank could achieve the same tax advantage by issuing debt -which would be cheaper -because it does not need to use trust preferred securities to meet capital requirements. It is also clear from Figure 2 that the introduction of TPS is useful for the low franchise value bank whose optimal probability of default p LFV * is higher than p R . The low franchise value bank in Figure 2 can increase its value by substituting TPS for equity in meeting its capital requirement until it reaches the threshold p R' . In other words, the bank benefits from regulatory arbitrage. Because the probability of default is inversely related to the ratio of equity to value, regulatory arbitrage allows a bank to meet its regulatory capital requirement with less equity. Of course, a financial institution will have access to multiple sources of regulatory arbitrage and will use all of them as long as capital requirements force it to have a lower probability of default than it would choose on its own.
To summarize, we derive the following testable hypotheses from our discussion:
H1: Banks that are constrained by capital regulation will issue TPS to increase their probability of default so that it is closer to its optimal level.
H2: Banks that are constrained by capital regulation will use both TPS and other types of regulatory arbitrages to increase their probability of default.
H3: Banks that are constrained by capital regulation will use TPS to be riskier than they otherwise could be, and will therefore have a shorter distance to default.
H4: Because banks with more TPS have a higher probability of default, their common stock will suffer more from adverse shocks.
TPS reduces its common equity and increases its long-term debt. From this perspective, keeping all else constant, replacing equity with trust preferred increases the probability that the bank will default.
Background on Trust Preferred Securities

A. Trust Preferred Securities and Tier 1 Capital
Trust preferred securities (TPS) are cumulative non-perpetual preferred securities issued by subsidiaries (special purpose entities, or SPEs) of bank holding companies (BHCs) whose sole asset is junior subordinated debt issued by the BHC. The bank holding company typically purchases 100% of the common equity of the SPE (which typically represents about 3% of the total assets of the trust). The SPE then issues preferred securities to investors. The SPE loans the offering proceeds of both the common and preferred securities to the bank holding company. In turn, the bank holding company issues deeply subordinated deferrable interest debentures to the SPE. The SPE is structured as a statutory business trust and is taxed as a partnership. Quarterly interest paid to the trust is used to pay dividends to holders of TPS.
BHCs may defer this interest for up to 20 quarters without triggering default. If the BHC exceeds this deferral period, the note is considered in default and becomes immediately due and payable. Interest paid on the notes issued to the trust is tax-deductible for the BHC. Most TPS are callable after 5 or 10 years, and all TPS are mandatorily redeemable after 30 or 40 years.
This type of security has been used by non-bank corporations since 1993, and is also known as monthly-income preferred stock (MIPS) or quarterly-income preferred stock (QUIPS). 8 The first TPS issue by a BHC did not occur until after October 21, 1996, when the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) announced that bank holding companies may include trust preferred securities up to 25% of core capital for their highest quality (Tier 1) regulatory capital. 9 Core capital is a grossed up version of Tier 1 capital that does not reflect deductions for disallowed intangible assets, goodwill, and disallowed deferred tax assets.
Importantly, these securities would not qualify as Tier 1 capital if the BHC were to directly issue cumulative non-perpetual preferred stock. Therefore, the TPS structure facilitates regulatory arbitrage.
While BHCs are permitted to include TPS in regulatory capital, their subsidiary depository institutions are not, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) arguing that TPS do not provide sufficient capital support. Therefore, all TPS issuance is at the bank holding company level.
B. Changes to the TPS market through time
In 2000, Salomon Smith Barney issued the first TPS collateralized debt obligation, allowing small BHCs to issue TPS through a pooled structure. 10 This market grew rapidly, with about $60 billion issued by over 1,800 banks between 2000 and 2007 (Cordell, Hopkins, and Huang (2011) 
Data
Our data come from several sources. The core sample is an unbalanced panel of all publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies that report on form FR Y-9C, which is filed quarterly on a consolidated basis by all domestic bank holding companies with over $150 million in assets ($500 million after 2006).
This data is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Our dataset covers the period from 1996 to 2012, and includes 857 BHCs. Data on individual trust preferred securities are from SNL Financial, a private data provider that uses information from a variety of sources to create a proprietary database. We supplement the TPS data from SNL Financial using hand-collected data from forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, and TPS prospectuses (for publicly traded TPS) found at the SEC's website. Some data on publicly traded TPS is from Quantum Online, a website that collects information about publicly traded preferred securities. Detailed data on mergers and acquisitions come from SNL Financial. Stock price data come from CRSP. Finally, data on BHC failures and delistings are hand-collected from the SEC's website.
A. TPS Summary Statistics
We have data on 1,467 separate TPS issuances. Figure 3 shows the total amount of TPS, the total Tier 1 qualified TPS outstanding by quarter, and the proportion of BHCs that have issued TPS. The total 12 These new requirements are generally consistent with, and in some cases more stringent than, the Basel III capital standards. Dodd-Frank also phases out cumulative perpetual preferred stock and mandatory convertible securities, whose usage has been much less extensive than TPS in the US (TPS made up 82% of restricted Tier 1 capital as of December 2010.) Both Dodd-Frank and Basel III also propose other changes to regulatory capital requirements. amount of TPS outstanding (Tier 1 qualified TPS) for publicly-traded BHCs was just under $20 ($20) billion at the end of 1996 and rose to a peak of about $140 ($120) billion in early 2010. It is evident from the figure that banks did not initially issue more TPS than would count towards Tier 1 capital. forward. The underwriting cost is the difference between the price paid to the issuer and the price at which the shares are sold, as a percent of the price at which the shares are sold. Averages are taken by
year, and then across years. Underwriting costs are significantly higher for common stock than for TPS, but lower for long-term debt, indicating that in addition to being a tax-deductible type of Tier 1 capital, TPS are also less expensive to issue than common stock. deposits, lower cash, more loans, and higher derivative usage. They are also more likely to repurchase stock, and have higher internal and external growth than unconstrained banks. The results are consistent across means and medians.
B. Bank Holding Company Data
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we investigate whether the data are consistent with the hypotheses we present in Section 2. The first hypothesis is that banks that issue TPS are constrained by regulatory capital requirements. We investigate a bank's first issuance decision for TPS and then relate the ratio of TPS to Tier 1 capital to our proxies for capital constraints. The second hypothesis is that constrained banks will also use other types of regulatory arbitrage, so we investigate whether banks that choose TPS also use ABCP. The third hypothesis is that constrained banks that use TPS are choosing to be riskier and, therefore, will have a shorter distance to default, which we test by examining the relationship between lagged TPS usage and a bank's z score. Finally, we investigate how constrained banks with a higher probability of default are affected by an adverse shock -the credit crisis -by examining their likelihood of requiring TARP funding and by evaluating their operating and stock performance in the crisis.
A. TPS Initial Issuance Decision
We use a Cox proportional hazard model to examine the determinants of the decision by a BHC to issue TPS for the first time. The proportional hazard model relates the explanatory variables to the hazard of first-time TPS issuance during the next time interval. The model takes into account that not all BHCs issue TPS during the sample period. Because we model the time to first issuance, all subsequent issues are ignored. TPS that come on the balance sheet through an acquisition are not treated as issuances. Table 3 reports hazard ratios, which enable us to assess more easily the economic significance of the explanatory variables. A hazard ratio greater than 1 means that an increase in the value of the variable is associated with a greater likelihood of issuing TPS. The opposite is true if the ratio is less than 1.
We predict that banks that are more constrained by capital requirements are more likely to issue TPS.
The coefficients on our two proxies for financial constraints are statistically significant and have hazard ratios less than 1 in all five specifications. Further, these coefficients are economically significant in all specifications. The hazard ratio for franchise value is important for our theory since we predict that banks with higher franchise values are less likely to issue TPS. The value of 0.157 in specification (1) means that the expected probability of issuing TPS is about 84.3% lower when franchise value increases by 1 unit. Since the standard deviation of franchise value is 0.073, this implies that for a one standard deviation increase in franchise value the likelihood of a bank issuing TPS goes down by 6%. Similarly, the hazard ratio of 0.864 for the Tier 1 ratio (%) in Column (3) implies that for a one percentage point increase in the Tier 1 ratio (%), the probability of issuing TPS goes down by 14%.
Specifications (1) through (5) indicate that other variables are associated with capital requirement constraints. Specifically, we would expect banks with strong asset growth, banks that engage in mergers, banks with poor earnings, and banks with riskier assets to be more constrained, and indeed, we show that these banks are more likely to issue TPS. We would expect banks with higher levels of cash relative to assets to have business models that benefit from relatively low risk, and we find supporting evidence that these banks are less likely to issue TPS. Although we have no prediction about the relation between derivatives trading and TPS issuance, we show that BHCs with high levels of trading derivatives are significantly more likely to issue TPS. To examine whether taxes affect the likelihood of issuing TPS, we use the state tax rate. The hazard ratio for the state tax rate is not significantly different from one.
Larger BHCs and BHCs with good prior period stock performance are more likely to issue TPS, which is inconsistent with the view that banks are constrained by capital requirements because of poor performance. Another indication that issuers are not poor performers, but rather are banks that choose to have low levels of capital, is that banks that repurchase stock are more likely to issue TPS.
In an untabulated analysis, we compare Tier 1 ratios for BHCs in the year prior to issue and in the year following issue. The average first-time issuer has a Tier 1 ratio of 11.3% in the year prior to issue and a remarkably similar Tier 1 ratio of 11.4% in the year following issue, despite issuing TPS of about 17% of the prior year's Tier 1 capital. Where does this extra capital go? Consistent with Table 3 , BHCs use the extra capital to fund acquisitions and internal growth. The average asset growth for first time issuers is 25% of assets, or about $2.5 billion. Had these banks not issued TPS, the average Tier 1 ratio would be much lower, at just 9.5%. This result implies that banks with rapid asset growth issue TPS to keep regulatory capital levels close to their targets.
In all but the last regression in Table 3 , insider ownership has a hazard ratio significantly greater than 1. This result is not predicted by our theory. However, it points to an additional reason why BHCs might choose to issue TPS. A fast-growing bank that has to keep issuing securities to satisfy capital requirements will dilute the ownership ratio of its insiders if it issues equity. Consequently, insiders are likely to prefer to issue TPS rather than equity in such a situation.
B. TPS / Tier 1 Ratio
We now examine the determinants of the TPS / Tier 1 ratio by using regressions in which the dependent variable is the TPS / Tier 1 ratio of a bank and the explanatory variables are bank characteristics that could affect this ratio. The ratio can vary because of growth in retained earnings and new common equity issuances that affect the denominator, or because of new TPS issuance or TPS redemptions that affect the numerator. In Table 4 , specifications (1) to (4) include year-fixed effects and BHC fixed effects to control for unobserved variation at the BHC level. Because there are a number of bank-firm-years with a TPS / Tier 1 ratio of zero, specifications (5) to (7) use Tobit regressions with yearfixed effects and standard errors clustered by BHC. In addition to left-censoring at zero, specification (6) also right-censors the dependent variable at 0.25, because Figure 4 , Panel B shows a high fraction of
BHCs with a TPS / Tier 1 ratio of 0.25. Specification (7) lags the main independent variables of interest by 5 years to examine the possibility that these independent variables might be simultaneously determined with the TPS / Tier 1 ratio.
As predicted by our theory, bank holding companies with more franchise value and higher Tier 1 capital have less TPS in their Tier 1 capital. The results hold both for the firm-fixed effects regressions,
where effects are estimated from within-bank variation, and for the Tobit regressions. For the firm-fixed effects regressions, we can gauge the economic magnitude of the estimated coefficients by multiplying them by the time-series standard deviation of franchise value (0.047) or the Tier 1 ratio (2%). For example, in specification (4) which includes both franchise value and the Tier 1 ratio, a one (within) standard deviation increase in franchise value (Tier 1 ratio) is associated with a decrease of 0.047 x 0.118 = 0.006 (2.00 x 0.002 = 0.004) in the TPS / Tier 1 ratio. Relative to the median TPS / Tier 1 ratio, this is a 22% (16%) decrease.
In the firm-fixed effects regressions, several bank characteristics have strong predictive power for the level of the TPS / Tier 1 ratio. If a bank becomes larger and takes on more risk-weighted assets, if it has a lower return on assets, or if its deposits decrease, its TPS / Tier 1 ratio significantly increases. When banks have fast internal growth, which makes them more likely to be constrained by capital requirements, they increase their TPS / Tier 1 ratios. If idiosyncratic volatility increases, so does the TPS / Tier 1 ratio.
These results corroborate our hypothesis that banks with riskier business models that are more likely to be constrained by capital requirements will use TPS more heavily. Banks with larger notional amounts of derivatives and lower past stock returns have lower TPS / Tier 1 ratios.
Surprisingly, the repurchase indicator variable is negative. By contrast, the repurchase dummy is positive in Table 3 , which models a bank's first TPS issuance decision. One possible explanation for this result is that regulators impose limits on how much stock a bank may repurchase in a given quarter.
Specifically, the amount of a bank's common stock must not drop below the amount of common stock outstanding at the beginning of the quarter. To test whether this constraint was binding during the sample period, we limit the sample to periods of positive TPS issuance, and calculate the mean TPS issuance and the mean change in common stock for these periods. We find evidence that regulatory constraints on stock repurchases are binding. The average net TPS issuance of $83 million is over six times the average change in common stock of $13 million. In other words, BHCs that issued TPS did not repurchase common stock on net at the same time. More important, the maximum amount of stock that a bank could repurchase in a given period and still meet regulatory requirements was far below the amount of TPS that banks issued, suggesting that stock repurchases were not the main use of TPS funds. 18 Columns (5) to (7) show results from Tobit panel regressions. Large internationally active bank holding companies were initially encouraged and, after 2004, were restricted by regulators to have a lower TPS / core capital ratio (up to 15% instead of 25%) than other banks. We create an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC has total assets larger than $250 billion or if the Federal Reserve Statistical
Release "Large Commercial Banks" shows that the main subsidiary bank of the BHC has more than $10 billion in foreign assets. 19 The results for franchise value and the Tier 1 ratio in Column (5) are economically larger than for the fixed effects regressions. A one standard deviation increase in franchise value is associated with a 2.8% decrease in the TPS / Tier 1 ratio. A one standard deviation increase in the Tier 1 ratio is associated with a 5.9% decrease in the TPS / Tier 1 ratio. As expected, the indicator variable for a large bank is negative and economically large (but not statistically significant):
Internationally active banks have about 10.7% less TPS / Tier 1 than other banks. Most other bank characteristics have the same explanatory power as in the firm-fixed effect regressions. In Column (6), we right-censor the dependent variable at 0.25 since we observe clustering at this level of the TPS / Tier 1 ratio. 20 The upper limit has almost no effect on the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance.
Column (7) shows results if we substitute lagged franchise value and Tier 1 ratio with franchise value and 18 Further, when we redo the tests of Table 4 year by year, we find evidence of a positive relationship between TPS issuance and repurchase activity for the first two years of the sample period (consistent with Benston et al (2003) ), but a negative relationship for the rest of the period, indicating that for most of the sample period firms are not using TPS for repurchases. This finding also helps explain the positive coefficient on repurchases in Table 3 , which models the initial TPS issuance decision; early TPS issuance is more likely to be used for repurchases than subsequent TPS issuance. 19 Internationally active BHCs are defined as those with over $250 billion in assets or $10 billion in foreign exposure. There is, to the best of our knowledge, no publicly available list of these banks, because the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's (FFIEC) country exposure report on foreign assets is not in the public domain. The Federal Reserve maintains a web page where it lists the largest US commercial banks and the fraction of domestic assets they hold, by quarter. These data are however for the depository bank subsidiaries and not for the bank holding companies. Hence, our procedure misses those BHC with less than $250 billion in total assets in which the main subsidiary bank does not hold $10 billion in foreign assets but the BHC does on a consolidated basis.
Because there are only 10 or so internationally active banks each year, these missing internationally active BHC are unlikely to make a difference in the regressions. 20 The regulatory upper limit for TPS / Tier 1 is not exactly 0.25 since the regulatory limit is based on core capital, not Tier 1 regulatory capital. However, observations cluster at this threshold, which is why we use it. Changing the upper limit to 0.33 does not qualitatively or quantitatively change our conclusions.
Tier 1 ratio that are lagged by five years. We use this specification to reduce concerns that TPS / Tier 1 and our proxies for constrained banks may be jointly determined by some unobserved time-varying characteristics. Lagged franchise value and the lagged Tier 1 ratio continue to be statistically and economically highly significant.
C. Regulatory Arbitrage and Asset Backed Commercial Paper
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a constrained bank will use all available opportunities to optimize its level of risk. We next relate TPS-based regulatory arbitrage to another type of regulatory arbitrage. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) argue that banks used asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits as a form of regulatory arbitrage during the 2000s. These conduits allowed banks to move assets off their balance sheets, which improved their Tier 1 ratios by reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the Tier 1 ratio). However, banks generally retained the risk associated with these assets by providing liquidity or credit guarantees should the underlying assets fail to roll over and/or default. Similar to our results for trust preferred securities, we find that capital constrained banks had more conduit exposure than other banks.
We examine whether the same banks that used ABCP for regulatory arbitrage were also significant users of TPS, thereby using both instruments to increase their probability of default given the regulatory context. In Appendix B, we list the names of banks with conduit exposure at any point during the sample period, based on four items reported in Forms FR Y-9C since 2001. 21 Appendix B also provides detail on whether banks have TPS outstanding during the period, and the average size of the bank's assets and ABCP exposure, sorted in order of total sponsored ABCP exposure. These data differ from Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) in that the Form FR Y-9C data provide detail on the guarantees on both sponsored and other conduits. Additionally, we list all banks with conduit exposure, not just those with assets greater than $50 billion at the end of 2006.
As in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) , most ABCP exposure is with a few large banks. Because of economies of scale, a bank is more likely to use TPS than ABCP as a means of regulatory arbitrage.
However, if a bank uses ABCP, we would expect it to also use TPS. This turns out to be true. All but one of the banks that have sponsored ABCP also have TPS.
In unreported tests, we redo the analyses from Table 4 , adding ABCP / risk-weighted assets as an independent variable. Since ABCP data is only available since 2001, this reduces the sample size. There is a positive relationship between ABCP usage and high levels of TPS / Tier 1, which is significant at the 10% level or better in 5 of the 7 regression specifications. Therefore, the overlap between TPS and ABCP that we document in Appendix B is borne out in a more rigorous regression model, implying that these constrained banks are more likely to have ABCP conduits. Table 5 performs a more direct test of the relationship between the propensity for constrained banks to increase their probability of default and ABCP usage. We regress ABCP usage on our proxies for whether banks are constrained and control variables. The dependent variable is one of three measures of ABCP usage in the spirit of Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013): Total ABCP / risk-weighted assets, credit protection ABCP / risk-weighted assets, and liquidity protection ABCP / risk-weighted assets. 22
The control variables are as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) and include the log of total assets, short-term debt / assets, loans / assets, and deposits over assets as well as year-fixed effects. In addition to fixed-effects regressions, we also estimate Tobit regressions, since the ABCP variable suffers from leftcensoring. In all six specifications, the coefficients on the Tier 1 ratio are significantly negative, indicating strong support for the hypothesis that constrained banks use ABCP to increase their probability of default. The economic significance is high. Taking the results from Column (1), the coefficient on the Tier 1 ratio is -0.017. Given the mean and standard deviation of 0.17% and 1% respectively, this implies a 10% decrease in ABCP / risk-weighted assets for every 1% increase in the Tier 1 ratio. Further, consistent with Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) , the results are stronger for liquidity protection ABCP facilities compared to credit protection facilities. However, the coefficient on franchise value is not significant.
Therefore, one of our proxies for being constrained is strongly linked to ABCP issuance (Tier 1 ratio), while the other (franchise value) is not. In an attempt to explain this result, we note that only large banks issue ABCP, and that franchise value is fairly homogeneous for large banks. There may not be enough time-series and cross-sectional variation to reliably identify the relation between ABCP issuance and franchise value. 23
Our results provide strong evidence that the same banks that use TPS to increase the numerator of their Tier 1 ratio also use ABCP to decrease the denominator of their Tier 1 ratio. Both activities are a form of regulatory arbitrage that allows constrained banks to move closer to their desired probability of default without a reduction in Tier 1 capital.
E. TPS and bank risk
We now analyze our third and fourth hypotheses, which posit that banks with TPS are riskier (Hypothesis 3) and that this riskiness will lead to bigger problems if banks experience a negative shock (Hypothesis 4). Note that our theory does not predict that higher riskiness is due to TPS alone. Rather, with our theory, banks engage in regulatory arbitrage so that they can be riskier than they would be in the absence of regulatory arbitrage. We first investigate whether banks with TPS have a smaller distance to default during our sample period. The distance to default is a standard measure to estimate the probability of default of a firm. Next, keeping regulatory capital constant, we would expect banks with more TPS to be more adversely affected by large negative shocks. We test this proposition using the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We would expect banks with more TPS to be more affected by the crisis. An alternative hypothesis is that safer banks require a smaller cushion to protect them from shocks, so that they would use TPS because it enables them to reduce the cushion they require. With this alternative hypothesis, there would no reason for banks with TPS to be affected more by the crisis. We show that first, banks with more TPS were more likely to use the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and that second, these banks had worse accounting and stock return performance during the crisis.
E.1. Distance to Default and TPS Usage
We first examine whether TPS usage is correlated with a common proxy for bank risk from 1996 to 2011. Our measure of risk is the bank's z-score, a distance-to-default measure. We follow Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) and Laeven and Levine (2009) and calculate the z-score as the ratio of the return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets, where capital is the market value of equity. The standard deviation of ROA is calculated using six years of quarterly data.
A higher z-score indicates that the bank is further away from default. Table 6 reports regressions of the z-score on our measure of TPS / Tier 1 capital and control variables. The table shows that banks with more TPS had a significantly lower distance to default, using both the z-score or log(z-score) measure. The effect is economically important. A one standard deviation increase in TPS / Tier 1 (0.117) is associated with a decrease in the z-score of 0.47. The effects are similar in economic magnitude if we use the log measure in Columns (3) and (4). As for the other explanatory variables, we find that better capitalized banks, banks with better returns in the prior year, banks with lower idiosyncratic volatility, banks with lower book-to-market ratios, banks with a less correlated loan portfolio, and banks with lower asset growth have a larger distant to default. 24 Although the distribution of the z-score measure in our sample is not too skewed, we report regression results for both the z-score and log(z-score) for better comparability to other studies. Most papers including Laeven and Levine (2009) report results using log(z-score).
E.2. TARP and TPS Usage
Our fourth hypothesis is that banks with a higher ratio of TPS / Tier 1 are riskier, so that we would expect them to have been affected more strongly by the financial crisis. One measure of the impact of the crisis on a bank is whether it received TARP funding. Of the 382 banks in our sample at the start of the crisis in July 2007, 174 received CPP funding. For our analysis, we drop six of these banks that were among the initial recipients of CPP since these banks were strongly encouraged to participate in the program by Secretary of the Treasury Paulson. 26 Results do not change if we include these banks. Of the remaining 168 banks, the average CPP funding per bank in the sample was $265 million and the median was $40 million. Since our hypotheses predict that banks with higher levels of TPS / Tier 1 are more likely to suffer during a financial crisis, we predict that these banks will be more likely to use the CPP program. (2012)). These variables include either the Tier 1 ratio or the regulatory leverage ratio, which is Tier 1 / Total Assets. Since these variables have a correlation coefficient of 0.75, they are included in separate regressions. Regressions also include the log of total assets to control for size, idiosyncratic volatility and beta to control for risk, a bank's book to market ratio, prior year stock performance and ROA, and the prior three-year mean of asset growth. 27
The results presented in Table 7 provide strong evidence that the banks that use TPS are more likely to use the CPP program. The effects are economically large and statistically significant. In Column (2), a one standard deviation increase in TPS / Tier 1 (0.117) is associated with a 9.8% (0.117x0.841=0.098) higher chance of receiving TARP funds. The Tier 1 capital ratio is strongly negatively related to CPP use, and the regulatory leverage ratio is weakly negatively related to CPP use, implying that better-capitalized banks are less likely to participate in the CPP. The other control variables are mostly insignificant. Banks that used TPS were more likely to need government assistance during the financial crisis, consistent with our hypothesis that these banks are riskier. 28
In untabulated regressions, we use the actual dollar amount of CPP funding as a fraction of Tier 1 capital instead of a CPP indicator variable. The results are statistically significant and economically large.
For example, in a regression that mimics Column (2) of Table 7 , we find that a one standard deviation increase in TPS / Tier 1 increases the ratio of CPP funding / Tier 1 by 2.6%, or 19% relative to the mean CPP funding / Tier 1 ratio of 0.135. 27 Results are robust to the inclusion of an indicator variable set to one if the bank is internationally active to control for different TPS requirements for those banks. 28 An obvious additional question is whether banks with higher levels of TPS were more likely to fail during or after the crisis. However, the existence of CPP and a host of other government programs made failure less likely during the crisis, especially among the largest banks. We perform a t-test for differences in TPS / Tier 1 for banks that fail between July 2007 and December 2009 and find that banks with higher TPS / Tier 1 ratios are more likely to fail. However, this analysis does not hold up to a multivariate regression analysis, likely because of the existence of government programs that prevented failures.
E.3. Crisis Performance and TPS Usage
Next, we evaluate the relation between bank performance during the financial crisis and TPS usage.
Our hypothesis predicts that banks with high levels of TPS should perform worse during the crisis. We evaluate both stock price performance and operating performance (return on assets before income taxes).
We consider the performance of BHCs from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008 to correspond to the returns during the crisis. These results are robust to alternative crisis ending dates of March 31, June 30, or September 30, 2009. As in Table 7 , all explanatory variables are measured prior to the crisis as of June 30, 2007. (1), which includes just the TPS / Tier 1 ratio, the coefficient on TPS / Tier 1 is negative and strongly statistically significant. The coefficient loses its significance in Column (2) when we include the Tier 1 ratio and a number of other controls. However, in Column (3), which includes regulatory leverage as a control variable, the coefficient on TPS / Tier 1 is negative and strongly statistically significant. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the TPS / Tier 1 ratio (0.106) decreases annualized crisis returns by 2.9%. Relative to the sample BHC's annualized crisis return of -25.2%, this corresponds to an 11.5% lower return. For the ROA regressions in Columns (4) to (6), the coefficient on TPS / Tier 1 is negative and statistically significant regardless of the control variables used. As with the stock performance regressions, the economic magnitude is meaningful. The average BHC has an annualized ROA of 0.86%. A one standard deviation increase in TPS / Tier 1 decreases ROA by 0.29% (0.106*(-0.028)) in Column (5) (with the Tier 1 ratio as a control variable) and 0.33% in Column (6) (which includes the leverage ratio as a control variable). Relative to the sample mean, these correspond to 34% and 39% lower returns, respectively.
The control variables in the stock return regressions are of the expected sign and consistent with recent findings. Small banks and banks with high Tier 1 ratios performed better during the crisis. Banks with high idiosyncratic volatility, high book to market ratios, more concentrated loan portfolios, and high growth over the past three years did worse during the crisis. Finally, there is some evidence that bank holding companies with higher betas did better during the crisis. 29 For the ROA regressions, we find that bank holding companies that are larger, have higher book-to-market ratios, higher growth over the past three years, and more concentrated loan portfolios had worse performance during the crisis.
Conclusion
Our paper provides a theory for why some banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and others do not.
Our theory is that banks have different optimal levels of risk depending on their franchise values. Banks with high franchise values find it optimal to have low levels of risk and high levels of capital. These banks are unconstrained by capital requirements. In contrast, banks with low franchise values find it optimal to have high levels of risk and low levels of capital. Such banks are constrained by capital requirements. Constrained banks take actions to relax these constraints when possible. Therefore, we predict that constrained banks will use regulatory arbitrage, such as issuing TPS. TPS allows constrained banks to satisfy capital requirements with more risk than banks that do not issue TPS. Effectively, a bank with TPS in its regulatory capital is more levered than a bank that has the same amount of regulatory capital comprised solely of common equity. Since TPS are a combination of equity and debt, replacing equity with TPS amounts to an increase in the bank's debt.
We show that banks that use trust preferred securities have lower franchise values and Tier 1 capital ratios. Consistent with our theory, we also show that banks that issue TPS are more likely to engage in other forms of regulatory arbitrage such as using ABCP conduits. We expect banks that issue more TPS to be riskier than other banks, and we find that banks with more TPS have a smaller distance-to-default during our sample period. We also expect riskier banks to have been more fragile during the financial crisis and show that, everything else equal, a bank that had more TPS in its capital structure was more likely to receive TARP funding and had worse stock performance during the 2007 crisis. -1900.html. 31 Prior to the passage of FASB 46 in 2003, minority interest was not categorized into Classes A, B, and C, and TPS were classified as minority interest. There was also no specific limit on how much of a bank's Tier 1 capital could be comprised of minority interest, with the exception of TPS, which were limited to 25% of core capital. The definition of core capital was also slightly different prior to FASB 46, and included common stockholders' equity, qualifying noncumulative perpetual preferred stock including related surplus, qualifying cumulative perpetual preferred stock including related surplus (up to a 25% of core capital limit), and minority interest in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. The concept of "restricted securities" was introduced after FASB 46. The table presents means and medians for key characteristics of the bank holding companies (BHC) in the sample from 1996 to 2012. Summary statistics are calculated by bank and then across banks, and are winsorized at the 1%/99% tails. Summary statistics are calculated separately for banks that never issued Trust preferred securities (TPS) during the sample period and those that issued TPS. There are 857 banks in the dataset, of which 518 issued TPS and 339 did not. Franchise value is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities, scaled by the difference between the book value of assets and goodwill. Tier 1 ratio (%) is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. Regulatory Leverage Ratio is Tier 1 capital scaled by total assets. Beta is the regression coefficient from a market model of excess daily returns on the value-weighted CRSP index for the two-year period prior to the reporting date, and idiosyncratic volatility is the residual from this regression. Loan concentration index is a Herfindahl-like index measuring the concentration of the loan portfolio as in Berger and Bouwman (2013) . Derivatives (trading) / assets is the gross notional principal of derivatives used for trading purposes scaled by assets, and Derivatives(other) / assets is the gross notional principal of derivatives used for purposes other than trading scaled by assets. The column difference shows the differences between the group of issuers and non-issuers. Statistically significant differences at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with * , ** , and *** respectively. The table presents results from regressions of ABCP conduit total exposure, credit exposure and liquidity exposure scaled by risk-weighted assets, on bank characteristics. Since these data are only available since 2001, the sample consists of 3,996 bank holding company-years (BHC-years). Independent variables are lagged one period, and described in detail in Sections 3 and 4. Regressions in Columns (1) to (3) include year-fixed effects and BHC-fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by BHC. Regressions in Columns (4) to (6) do not include BHC-fixed effects but take into account that the dependent variable is left-censored at zero. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with * , ** , and *** respectively, and p-values are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. -0.017 *** -0.001 * -0.014 *** -0.615 *** -0.047 * -0.724 *** (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) Bank Characteristics Log total assets t-1 0.002 *** 0.000 *** 0.002 *** 0.032 *** 0.003 *** 0.034 *** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Short-term debt / assets t-1 0. The table presents results from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of the z-score on TPS usage and other bank characteristics. The z-score is calculated as (ROA + capital ratio) /sigma(ROA)]. ROA is calculated as the sum of quarterly net income over one year divided by end-of-year total assets. The capital ratio (market value of equity / total assets) in the numerator is calculated as end-of-year. Sigma ROA is calculated using quarterly data from the six years prior to the year of interest. Independent variables are lagged one period, and described in detail in Sections 3 and 4. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the raw z-score. In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the log of the z-score. The z-score is winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. The independent variables are described in Sections 3 and 4. Regressions include year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with * , ** , and *** respectively, and p-values are reported below the coefficients in parentheses.
Means
Fixed-effects
Continuous z-score Log z-score (1)
(2) (3) (4) TPS / Tier 1 t-1 -7.072 ** -4.029 ** -0.668 *** -0.352 *** (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) Tier 1 ratio t-1 0.173 *** 0.013 *** (0.01) (0.01) Stock return t-1 4.587 *** 0.309 *** (0.00) (0.00) Log (market value) t-1 0.271 -0.008 (0.32) (0.63) Beta t-1 -0.497 -0.023 (0.40) (0.66) Idiosyncratic volatility t-1 -0.801 *** -0.126 *** (0.01) (0.00) Book / market t-1 -3.285 *** -0.462 *** (0.00) (0.00) Loan concentration index t-1 -4.470 *** -0.348 *** (0.00) (0.00) Mean asset growth, past 3 years 4.623 ** 0.373 *** (0.02) (0.00) Constant 12.368 *** 16.724 *** 2.294 *** 3.417 *** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) N 6,095 5,340 5,876 5,140 Includes year-fixed effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes R 2 0.37 0.54 0.33 0.55 Table 7 : CPP and TPS Usage The table shows results from probit regressions in which the dependent variable is set to 1 if the firm ever received funds from the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are measured pre-crisis in June 2007 and are described in Sections 3 and 4. The six banks in our sample that were required to take CPP funds (listed in Section 5.E.2) are omitted from the analysis. The table reports marginal effects. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with * , ** , and *** respectively, and p-values from heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. The table shows results from cross-sectional regressions of crisis returns on bank characteristics, measured in June 2007. In Columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is the buy-and-hold stock return of bank holding companies, and in Columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the return on assets before income tax. Returns are calculated from July 2007 through December 2008. The independent variables are described in Sections 3 and 4. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with * , ** , and *** respectively, and p-values from heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses.
Stock market return Return on assets before income tax (1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) TPS / Tier 1 -0.320 *** -0.163 -0.272 ** -0.065 *** -0.028 ** -0.031 ** (0 -0.039 *** -0.046 *** (0.00) (0.00) Beta 0.086 *** 0.092 *** -0.001 -0.001 (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.65) Idiosyncratic volatility -11.281 *** -11.080 *** -0.021 -0.023 (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.95) Book/market -0.153 *** -0.135 ** -0.048 *** -0.046 *** (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Loan concentration index -0.358 *** -0.296 *** -0.030 *** -0.028 *** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Mean asset growth, past 3 years -0.317 *** -0.374 *** -0.049 *** -0.050 *** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Constant -0.203 *** 0.543 *** 0.858 *** 0.019 *** 0.092 *** 0.122 *** (0.00) (0 
